While the trust gap between the parties seems deeper than ever today, the good news is that public opinion is dynamic. Camp David itself is an example of how easily public support for peace can be rapidly increased when the prospects become real. Investigations conducted in the Israeli-Palestinian context over time have also shown forcefully that if each side believes that the other is acting in good faith to seek peace, support for a negotiated agreement increases. This should ultimately serve as an incentive that opens the door for Israeli, Palestinian and third-party leaders who are willing to seize the opportunity and face the challenges of conflict with the pragmatism, empathy, courage and creativity that were hallmarks of Camp David. Arriving at this formula will not be an easy elevator. Israel, despite the success of the MFO and based on experience elsewhere, remains cynical about the effectiveness of international forces in combating threats to its territory and is not inclined to entrust its security to anyone else. The Palestinians have shown their willingness to accept the presence of a third party in a future Palestinian state, but see this prospect as a temporary measure. The particular complexity and asymmetries of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in relation to what existed between Israel and Egypt are likely to make squaring these circles even heavier than was unlikely at Camp David in 1978. The latter, however, offers lessons about the power of leadership and the political will to unlock what seems intractable and open the door to the kind of deal that could be maintained and strengthened by an MFO-type agreement. A particularly difficult situation occurred on the tenth day of the impasse in the talks.

The issues of Israel`s withdrawal from Sinai and the status of the West Bank have created an apparent stalemate. In response, Carter had the choice to try to save the deal by conceding the West Bank issue while endorsing Sadat`s less controversial stance on the withdrawal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the talks, pointed out the reasons for their failure, and blamed Begin. Just days after his speech, the two sides began informal and sporadic peace talks that would eventually culminate in the signing of the Camp David Accords, the first formal agreement of its kind between Israel and an Arab nation. The UN General Assembly rejected the Middle East peace framework because the agreement was reached without the participation of the UN and the PLO and was incompatible with the Palestinian right of return, self-determination and national independence and sovereignty. In December 1978, the Assembly stated in resolution 33/28 A that agreements were valid only if they were within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and resolutions, included the right of return of palestinians and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and were concluded with the participation of the PLO. The passive position of the Security Council has also been criticized. [20] On 6. In December 1979, in its resolution 34/70, the United Nations condemned all partial agreements and individual treaties that did not respect Palestinian rights and comprehensive peace solutions; it condemns the continuation of Israel`s occupation and calls for the withdrawal from all occupied territories. [21] On December 12, in its resolution 34/65 B, it rejected more specific parts of the Camp David Agreement and similar agreements that did not meet these requirements. All these partial agreements and individual treaties have been strongly condemned.

The part of the Camp David Agreement on the Palestinian future and all similar parts have been declared invalid. [22] Although the agreements were a historic agreement between two often divided parties, and Sadat and Begin shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their achievements (Jimmy Carter won in 2002 “for his decades of tireless efforts to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts”), their overall importance is questionable because the region is still in conflict. The future of the city of Jerusalem, which Israelis and Palestinians want as its capital, has been remarkably and intentionally excluded from this agreement, as it has been (and remains) a highly controversial issue – an issue that received renewed attention in 2017 thanks to President Donald Trump and his announcement that the city will be officially recognized as Israel`s capital. More importantly, the United Nations never officially accepted the first agreement of the agreements, the so-called “Framework for Middle East Peace,” because it was written without Palestinian representation and participation. The Camp David Accords also led to the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel. Egypt`s realignment has created a power vacuum that Saddam Hussein hoped to fill in Iraq, once a secondary power. Due to the vague language regarding the implementation of resolution 242, the Palestinian problem has become the main problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many Arab countries have accused Egypt of not exerting enough pressure on Israel to address the Palestinian problem in a way that would satisfy them.

Syria also told Egypt that it would not reconcile with the nation if it did not abandon the peace agreement with Israel. [8] Finally, Camp David is also representative of the dynamism of international politics and peacemaking. From the early to mid-1970s, no one would have predicted an Israeli-Egyptian peace until the end of the decade. The 1973 war had made both sides bloody and had been used by Sadat and the Arabs as a rhetorical tool. But within a few months, Sadat was in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), an agreement was negotiated at Camp David and a peace treaty in place for 40 years was signed. Despite decades of hostility before the deal, changes in direction and occasional points of tension since then, the public has adapted to a peace that serves its interests. This was another interim agreement or another stage, but the resulting negotiations slowed down for several reasons. This included the inability to involve Jordanians in the discussions; the controversy over regulations; the inconclusive nature of subsequent self-government talks; the internal opposition maintained by Begin and Sadat and, in sadat`s case, the exclusion and anger of the Arab world; the emergence of a cold peace between Egypt and Israel; and changes in foreign policy priorities, including the discontinuity of staff engaged in maintaining the negotiation process[.] [18] The agreement also led the U.S.

to commit to multi-billion dollar annual subsidies to the governments of Israel and Egypt, subsidies that continue to this day and are provided in the form of a mix of subsidies and aid programs for the purchase of U.S. materials. From 1979 (the year of the peace agreement) to 1997, Egypt received $1.3 billion in military aid per year, which also helped modernize the Egyptian military. [24] (This goes beyond economic, humanitarian and other assistance, which amounted to more than $25 billion.) Egypt, which was supplied by Eastern until 1979, has now received U.S. weapons such as the M1A1 Abrams tank, the AH-64 Apache gunboat and the F-16 fighter jet. By comparison, Israel has received $3 billion a year in grants and military aid programs since 1985. [25] The Camp David Agreement includes two separate agreements: “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” and “A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel,” the second agreement leading to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel signed in March 1979. Both the agreements and the peace treaty were accompanied by “side letters” of understanding between Egypt and the United States. and Israel and the United States[16] Carter visited the heads of state he had to rely on to make a peace agreement workable. By the end of his first year in power, he had already met with Anwar Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel.

Despite supporting Sadat`s peace initiative, King Hussein refused to participate in the peace talks; Begin offered Jordan little to gain, and Hussein was also afraid of isolating Jordan from the Arab world and provoking Syria and the PLO if he also participated in the peace talks. [7] Hafez al-Assad, who had no interest in peace negotiations with Israel,[8] also refused to come to the United States and only agreed to a meeting with Carter in Geneva. .